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Closure in Damage Class Settlements:
The Godfather Guide to Opt-Out Rights
Richard A. Nagareda'
INTRODUCTION
The right to opt out is a peculiar creation of the modern class
action.' The right holds a sanctified status as a doctrinal matter
but, at the same time, stands curiously at odds with the class ac-
tion in practical terms. In Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts,2 the
Supreme Court famously spoke of the right to opt out as having
constitutional status.3 As a matter of due process, the Shutts
Court said, the members of a class seeking relief in the form of
damages must be afforded the opportunity to exclude themselves
from the class.' Given the prevalence of settlements-rather than
full-scale trials-as the ultimate outcome of actions certified to
proceed on a class-wide basis,' the right to opt out amounts, in
practical terms, to a right to escape the preclusive effect of a
Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School. John Goldberg, Michael Rozen, and
Jeffrey Schoenblum provided helpful comments on the matters discussed in this Article.
Wendy Ertmer and Stephanie Wolfe provided both substantive comments and research
assistance.
The major innovation of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 23")
consists of its recognition in 1966 of a new type of class action in which the court must
afford would-be class members the opportunity to exclude themselves from the class. The
Rule 23(b)(3) class action along these lines differs from its procedural predecessor,
whereby persons situated similarly to the named class representatives were not part of
the class unless such persons affirmatively intervened in the litigation. The drafters of
Rule 23(b)(3) developed the notion of an opt-out class in order to prevent the phenomenon
of one-way intervention-persons choosing to intervene in the class action only after its
success was assured-prevalent under the predecessor rule. See Benjamin Kaplan, Con-
tinuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure (1), 81 Harv L Rev 356, 397-98 (1967).
472 US 797 (1985).
See id at 811-12 (discussing Fourteenth Amendment).
Id.
Robert H. Klonoff and Edward H.K Bilich, Class Actions and Other Multi-Party
Litigation 362 (West 2000). See also Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper and Robert J.
Niemic, An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 NYU
L Rev 74, 143 (1996) (empirical study supporting the prevalence of settlements in actions
certified to proceed on a class-wide basis that are not resolved on the basis of dispositive
motions).
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judgment approving the class settlement and thereafter, con-
ceivably, to sue the defendant in the ordinary civil justice system.
In the aftermath of Shutts, opt-out rights occupy an essential
role in any class settlement involving damage claims-at least,
outside the unusual scenario of claims against a limited fund,
when class membership is mandatory.7 Opt-out rights nonethe-
less are in tension with the objective of any class settlement to
achieve closure in the area of litigation in which it operates. This
sense of closure, and the predictability that comes with it, are
what defendants seek above all else in a class settlement.8 It
should come as no surprise, then, that a pervasive feature of class
settlement design consists of efforts, in one way or another, to
minimize the number of opt-outs.9
At first glance, opt-out minimization might seem like some-
thing directed at would-be class members themselves. They, after
all, are the holders of rights to sue the settling defendant. In
practical terms, however, efforts to minimize the number of opt-
outs speak at least as strongly to the law firms within the plain-
tiffs' bar plausibly positioned to represent opt-out claimants on
an individual basis in exchange for contingency fees. These firms
stand as the competitors of class counsel in the market for legal
representation of plaintiffs. To achieve closure in a class settle-
ment for damage claims, class counsel and their counterparts on
the defense side effectively must deter these competitor firms
within the plaintiffs' bar from undertaking or continuing the liti-
gation against the defendant.
This Article advances a descriptive claim that leads, in turn,
to a series of normative claims. The descriptive claim is that life
in the world of class settlement design has come to imitate art:
the techniques that class settlement designers have deployed to
deter opt-outs roughly track the techniques used by a celebrated
fictional organization to secure peace and predictability in the
face of tenacious competition from rivals of the same ilk. Specifi-
cally, the devices deployed by class settlement designers in recent
See FRCP 23(e) (requiring judicial approval of class settlements).
See FRCP 23(b)(1)(B) (authorizing class action where individual adjudication would
substantially impede ability of absent class members to protect their interests). On the
requirements for certification of a mandatory, limited fund class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B),
see Ortiz v Fibreboard Corp, 527 US 815, 838-47 (1999).
8 See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 Georgetown
L J 371, 420 (2001) (noting that defendants seek class certification to achieve finality).
' See Part II.
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years to deter opt-outs parallel three plot developments in Fran-
cis Ford Coppola's 1972 film, The Godfather."°
A. "I'm Gonna Make Him an Offer He Can't Refuse.""
This most famous line from The Godfather comes in a conver-
sation between Vito Corleone, then-head of the Corleone organ-
ized crime family, and his godson, Johnny Fontane, a popular
singer seeking the lead role in an upcoming Hollywood film.
12
Johnny explains that the producer of the film, Jack Woltz, has
refused him the lead role and that it is now too late for a change
in casting." Vito assures Johnny that he will land him the role,
explaining that he will make Woltz "an offer he can't refuse." 4
The "offer," of course, ultimately consists of the implicit threat to
Woltz's life conveyed by his receipt, in his bed, of the severed
head of his valuable stud horse, an offer made after Woltz bluntly
refuses the attempt of a Corleone family member to intercede on
Johnny Fontane's behalf."
The double-edged meaning of "an offer he can't refuse" stands
as an apt description of an issue at the forefront of class settle-
ment design. As to any given class member, a good opt-out class
settlement under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure or a state law equivalent 6 literally should be an offer that
cannot be refused. It should offer class members an alternative
bundle of rights that makes conventional civil litigation unattrac-
tive by comparison. In so doing, the class settlement should leave
10 Paramount 1972.
Id.
1 Id.
13 Id.
The Godfather, Paramount 1972.
'5 Id. Vito's remark about his plan for dealing with Woltz recalls another conversation
in the film in which the young Michael Corleone uses a similar phrase to describe an inci-
dent some years earlier. At that time, Vito and his enforcer, Luca Brasi, induced a reluc-
tant bandleader to sign a contract to release Johnny Fontane from a personal service
obligation in exchange for only modest consideration. In Michael's words: "Luca Brasi held
a gun to [the bandleader's] head, and my father assured him that either his brains or his
signature would be on the contract." Id.
Later in the film, Michael reuses the phrase to explain how he-now leader of the
Corleone family-plans to convince Moe Greene to sell his Las Vegas casino and, in so
doing, to enable the Corleones to move their operations to Nevada. Greene refuses and is
subsequently murdered on Michael's orders-a plot development that, as I shall explain in
Part III, gives rise to yet another analogue in the world of class settlements.
6 Many state class action rules track Rule 23. For a comprehensive guide to state
class action rules, see Linda S. Mullenix, State Class Actions: Practice and Procedure
(CCH 2000).
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rival plaintiffs' law firms with little to gain from a campaign to
represent opt-outs. But an opt-out class settlement might try to
make an offer that class members cannot refuse in the more sin-
ister sense used in The Godfather: an offer that is no offer at all
in practical terms but, rather, simply an illegitimate threat to
leave class members with nothing in the event that they refuse
the offer.
A proper conception of the class action should enable the law
to distinguish between these two sorts of offers. I set forth such a
conception here, focusing closely on recent efforts to design a
class settlement in the Sulzer hip implant litigation." Class set-
tlement designers there sought to leave open an opportunity to
opt out in theory but to deter its pursuit in practice-specifically,
to use a wily combination of a security interest and a trust fund
to leave practically nothing from which opt-out claimants might
recover. 8 The enterprise of opt-out deterrence, in fact, has deep
roots in the annals of class settlements, tracing its lineage at
least to events surrounding the opt-out class settlement for the
Agent Orange litigation in the early 1980s.' 9 Indeed, outside of
the class action realm, one can see a similar phenomenon at work
in the legislation enacted by Congress for compensation of victims
of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (the "9/11 Fund" leg-
islation). °
Systematic comparison of these various efforts to deter opt-
outs illuminates the nature of the class action. As I discuss in
greater depth in a companion article elsewhere,21 the law of class
actions, properly conceived, permits a broad range of class set-
tlement provisions to deter opt-outs. What an opt-out class set-
tlement may not do, however, is what Congress permissibly did in
the 9/11 Fund legislation: deter opt-outs by both providing class
members with an attractive alternative to conventional civil liti-
gation and altering detrimentally their preexisting legal rights in
the event that they forego that alternative and sue instead. My
first normative claim, in short, is that an opt-out class settle-
" In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liability Litigation, 204 FRD 330 (N D Ohio 2001).
Id at 351-52.
See Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial (Belknap Press enlarged ed 1987)
(detailing the story of the Agent Orange litigation).
"' Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Public L No 107-42, 115
Stat 230 (2001), codified at 49 USC § 40101 (2001).
" Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class
Action, 103 Colum L Rev 149 (2003).
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ment, unlike public legislation, enjoys no general mandate to al-
ter unilaterally the legal rights of would-be class members.
B. "Whoever Comes to You With This Barzini Meeting-He's the
Traitor. Don't Forget That."22
Later in The Godfather, the aging Vito Corleone issues this
warning to his son Michael, concerning an expected effort by the
rival Barzini family to invite Michael to a meeting-ostensibly for
the purpose of peacefully settling the two families' differences.23
Vito urges Michael to distrust this invitation, even though Vito
expects it to come through a trusted subordinate within the Cor-
leone criminal organization-from a "traitor" who actually is
working with the Barzini family to set up Michael to be murdered
at the meeting.24 Michael subsequently heeds Vito's advice, fore-
going the meeting and ordering the death of the subordinate
(Tessio) who comes to him with the Barzini invitation. 5
This idea of recruiting a trusted insider to persuade his co-
horts to support a deal that ultimately will benefit others has not
been lost upon class settlement designers. One of the techniques
that defendants use to elicit support for class settlements from
the plaintiffs' bar as a whole involves the retention of prominent
plaintiffs' lawyers as class settlement negotiators for the de-
fense. 26 To be sure, the recruitment of a prominent plaintiffs' law-
yer as the dealmaker for the settling defendant takes place
overtly, whereas the Barzinis sought (unsuccessfully) to keep se-
cret their recruitment of Tessio to betray the Corleones. The ul-
timate goal nonetheless remains for the recruited insider to per-
suade his supposed friends to embrace a deal-in the class set-
tlement context, to persuade rival plaintiffs' law firms not to un-
dertake the representation of opt-out claimants such as would
undermine the closure that a class settlement otherwise would
bring.
Interestingly enough, in both The Godfather and the world of
class settlements, the recruit-an-insider technique usually does
not work. The most prominent example of this technique in ac-
tion-a defendant's effort to use longtime plaintiffs' lawyer Rich-
The Godfather (Paramount 1972).
Id.
Id.
2" Id.
' See Mark Curriden, Switch-hitters Saving the Day, 87 ABA J 18, 18 (Nov 2001)
(discussing the rise of this technique in civil settlements generally).
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ard "Dickie" Scruggs as its class settlement negotiator-met with
the same suspicion from his cohorts within the plaintiffs' bar as
did the Barzini invitation to Michael Corleone.27
C. "Today, I Settle All Family Business."8
Michael delivers this line near the end of The Godfather as a
euphemistic summary of the actions undertaken on his orders to
"settle" the Corleones' ongoing disputes, not only with the Barzini
family but with all of the "five families" jockeying for control of
organized crime activities in the New York area: namely, the sys-
tematic murder on a single day of the leaders of all rival fami-
lies.29 The less lethal class action analogue would consist of im-
porting into the world of class settlements a feature increasingly
found in settlements of non-class litigation: contractual agree-
ments by plaintiffs' lawyers not to represent additional clients in
similar lawsuits.3 °
In the class settlement context, the trick lies in obtaining
such agreements from the firms within the plaintiffs' bar, other
than those class counsel, positioned to induce class members to
opt out and to represent them in individual damage actions.
Class settlement designers might try to achieve closure, in other
words, by effectively eliminating potential rivals for the represen-
tation of individuals within the class, albeit by paying those po-
tential rivals rather than by shooting them. A realistic conception
of class settlements-as measures that speak as much to rivalries
within the plaintiffs' bar as to disputes between the plaintiff class
and the settling defendant-should condemn such agreements.
My account of how class settlement design has come to repli-
cate unwittingly the plot of The Godfather and what the law
should do about it proceeds, appropriately enough, in three parts.
Part I sets the scene, discussing the strategic and doctrinal con-
siderations that underlie efforts to deter the exercise of the right
to opt out. Part II compares the three examples mentioned ear-
lier-the Sulzer hip implant class settlement, the Agent Orange
See Part II C.
The Godfather (Paramount 1972).
Id.
30 See Milo Geyelin, Some Companies Pay Lawyers Not to Sue Again, Wall St J B1
(May 16, 2001) (reporting the rise of such agreements in settlements of non-class law-
suits). In this regard, I simply make a descriptive observation of developments in settle-
ment practice, leaving for others the significant question of whether such agreements are
permissible as an ethical matter. See note 129.
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class settlement, and the 9/11 Fund legislation-in an effort to
discern a principled line between permissible and impermissible
deterrent devices for opt-outs. Part III analyzes the emergence of
devices to deter opt-outs by paying off the plaintiffs' law firms
best positioned to represent them, discussing the antitrust impli-
cations of such a strategy.
I. THE STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE OF OPT-OUT DETERRENCE
Strategy and doctrine converge to provide the designers of
opt-out class settlements with powerful incentives to embrace
settlement provisions to deter the exercise of the right to opt out.
Identification of these incentives starts with a recognition that
the overwhelming majority of class actions-that is, actions certi-
fied to proceed in the class format-result in settlements rather
than judgments after full-scale trials.31 As a practical matter,
class actions serve as the vehicles for "transactions" in which
class members' rights to sue are "bought and sold" 2 in exchange
for an alternative bundle of legal rights described in the class set-
tlement agreement.33
A. The Strategic Reasons to Deter Opt-Outs
Relief in the form of damages characterizes many areas of
substantive law in which class actions operate, ranging across
tort, securities, antitrust, and consumer protection law, among
other examples. Absent the existence of a limited fund such as
will warrant the certification of a mandatory class under Rule
23(b)(1)(B), a class action for damages may proceed, if at all, only
on a non-mandatory, opt-out basis.34 The structural distinction in
Rule 23 between mandatory and opt-out classes, however, exists
in tension with the strategic incentives of both defendants and
class counsel with respect to class settlements.3" To put the point
3 See note 5.
Rubenstein, 89 Georgetown L J at 419 (cited in note 8).
Id.
Absent the ability to satisfy the demands for a mandatory, limited fund class under
Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the only realistic alternative for a class action seeking damages is Rule
23(b)(3), which authorizes class certification on a nonmandatory, opt-out basis. See FRCP
23(b). Other portions of subsection (b) provide for the certification of mandatory class
actions in certain situations aside from those in which the relief sought consists predomi-
nantly of damages. See id.
See George Rutherglen, Better Late Than Never: Notice and Opt Out at the Settle-
ment Stage of Class Actions, 71 NYU L Rev 258, 279-80 (1996) (explaining that, because
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bluntly, both sides at the class settlement negotiation table have
reasons to design an ostensible opt-out class settlement to ap-
proach a mandatory class settlement in operation. The way to
achieve that goal is to deter the exercise of the right to opt out.
For defendants, the benefit from a class settlement involving
damage claims lies in the degree to which it will mark the
achievement of a lasting peace in the underlying area of litiga-
tion.36 Here, peace has a very specific meaning, consisting of the
absence of further lawsuits as a result of the preclusive effect
that flows from the judgment approving the class settlement
agreement under Rule 23(e).3' That judgment and the preclusive
effect that comes with it are what a settling defendant seeks to
purchase through the transaction that is the class settlement.
Any settlement in civil litigation holds the prospect of gains
for both sides by substituting the predictability of the settlement
agreement for the unpredictability that continued litigation
would entail. Exercise of the right to opt out undercuts-
potentially, quite dramatically-the peace that a class settlement
will bring.39 As existing commentary recognizes, moreover, opt-
outs are highly unlikely to be distributed evenly throughout a
class of damage claimants." Rather, because the right to opt out
is an individual right to be exercised on a class-member-by-class-
member basis,4' there is every reason to believe that opt-outs will
consist disproportionately of persons likely to have the most mar-
ketable damage claims on an individual basis. And, given the
pervasive use of contingency fee arrangements as the funding
of class members' interests in maintaining control of the claim and the defendant's inter-
est in attaining finality, both have an interest in minimizing the number of opt-outs).
" See Rubenstein, 89 Georgetown L J at 419 (cited in note 8) (explaining that defen-
dants settle in exchange for finality).
"' See id (noting that defendants settle to avoid the filing and trial of underlying
claims in a complex class action).
See id.
See Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analysis
of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 Emory L J 85, 143-44 (1997)
("[RIecognition of opt-out rights in cases in which they are feasibly employed can destroy
the effectiveness of the class action mechanism.").
" See id at 89; Rutherglen, 71 NYU L Rev at 278-79 (cited in note 35).
Courts have turned away efforts to opt out the members of nationwide damage
classes on a mass basis through the pursuit of rival class actions in state court confined to
the members of the nationwide class who reside in the forum state. See, for example, In re
Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Products Liability Litigation,
282 F3d 220, 225 (3d Cir 2002); Hanlon v Chrysler Corp, 150 F3d 1011, 1024 (9th Cir
1998).
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mechanism on the plaintiffs' side of civil litigation for damages,2
the most marketable damage claims are those that promise the
highest damage recoveries and, hence, the highest fees for the
attorneys who represent those claimants.
That high-value damage claims might leave the class, per-
haps in droves, is a troubling prospect for the settling defendant."
Without the ability to bind all would-be damage claimants to the
judgment in the class action, the defendant will have to resolve
opt-out cases in the ordinary civil litigation process. That process
and the uncertainty that accompanies it, however, are what the
settling defendant seeks to avoid by embracing a class settlement
in the first place." The incentive to settle will be especially strong
when the underlying damage claims include components that are
prone to variance, such as damages for pain and suffering"
and/or punitive damages based upon the perceived extremity of
the defendant's misconduct. 6 In fact, empirical researchers have
documented that, "[oln average, press announcements of punitive
damage lawsuits impose larger market value losses on the defen-
dant firms than the total compensatory and punitive damages
eventually awarded."' The prospect of variance in damage litiga-
tion imposes costs on defendants above and beyond the costs of
the damages ultimately paid and, as such, presents an inviting
prospect for gain through the reduction of that potential variance
by way of a settlement.
The upshot is that defendants have every reason to seek as
comprehensive of a class settlement as they can get, either
through the operation of Rule 23 in the special case of a limited
fund or through the design of an opt-out settlement to deter class
members from actually leaving the class. This tendency is not an
inevitably bad thing for class members. One way to deter class
41 See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal
Practice, 47 DePaul L Rev 267, 267 (1998).
4: See Perino, 46 Emory L J at 131-32 (cited in note 39) (discussing bargaining power
of credible opt-out threats).
4 Rubenstein, 89 Georgetown L J at 419 (cited in note 8).
" See, for example, Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method
for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 Cal L Rev 773,
777 (1995) ("[Jlury awards for pain and suffering vary widely for injuries that appear to be
equally severe.").
" See, for example, Daniel Kahneman, David A. Schkade, and Cass R. Sunstein,
Shared Outrage, Erratic Awards, in Cass Sunstein, et al, eds, Punitive Damages: How
Juries Decide 31 (Chicago 2002) (exploring potential sources of the unpredictability in
awards of punitive damages).
"' Jonathan M. Karpoff and John R. Lott, Jr., On the Determinants and Importance of
Punitive Damage Awards, 42 J L & Econ 527, 571 (1999).
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members from opting out is by presenting them with the prospect
of resolving their claims through a framework likely to prove
more efficient at the transfer of money from the defendant to in-
jured claimants than the ordinary civil litigation process. A class
settlement along these lines would indeed form an offer that class
members could not refuse, but it would do so in the non-sinister
sense of that phrase. Class settlements that truly are too good to
be refused, however, also are likely to cost money for the settling
defendant. The problem lies in the possibility that the defendant
might seek to deter opt outs illegitimately, not through the provi-
sion of generous benefits under the class settlement but through
the less costly vehicle of settlement structure.48
In this enterprise, the settling defendant is likely to find an
eager partner in class counsel as the self-appointed agent for the
class. Class counsel stand to gain financially from the bringing of
the class action only by precipitating a settlement from the de-
fendant or through the more risky, costly, and rare path of a full-
scale, class-wide trial.49 Moreover, as an ethical matter, class
counsel who seek to defend a class settlement as a fair deal for
the members of the class have no prospect of representing per-
sons who opt out, for they, by definition, have rejected the deal
negotiated by class counsel.
These two features of the legal landscape-a payoff tied to
the achievement of a settlement and an inability to gain from the
litigation of opt-out cases-together create an incentive for class
counsel to give heed to the defendant's desire for measures to de-
ter the exercise of the right to opt out. In order to gain the fees
from a class settlement, class counsel must get the defendant to
agree to a deal, and the defendant, for the reasons outlined above,
will have reason to make its assent dependent upon the inclusion
of measures to deter opt-outs.
B. The Unwitting Effect of Supreme Court Decisions
Class action doctrine accentuates, albeit inadvertently, the
pull of strategic considerations. The unintended effect of the
landmark Supreme Court decisions from the 1990s on damage
class settlements-Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor5" and Ortiz v
See, for example, the Sulzer settlement discussed in Part II C.
' See Kritzer, 47 DePaul L Rev at 270-71 (cited in note 42) (discussing the attorney's
assumed risks and the plaintiff's benefits from a contingency fee arrangement).
" 521 US 591 (1997).
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Fibreboard Corp5 -is to give negotiators all the more reason to
craft deals that look like opt-out class settlements but that func-
tion as mandatory ones in practical effect. In Amchem, the Court
decertified an opt-out class action under Rule 23(b)(3) brought
simply to serve as the enforcement device for the settlement of
damage claims by workers exposed to the asbestos-containing
products of some twenty companies.52 The Amchem Court noted
that the demands of Rule 23 for a high degree of cohesiveness
within the class and for adequate class representation bear
"heightened" attention in the settlement context, because a class
settlement operates to dispose of absent class members' rights to
sue.53
In Ortiz, the Court decertified a mandatory class action un-
der Rule 23(b)(1)(B) brought as the means to resolve the damage
claims of workers exposed to the asbestos-containing products of
Fibreboard Corporation.54 The Ortiz transaction enabled Fibre-
board, first, to resolve a long-running dispute with its insurers
over the extent of their coverage for the company's asbestos li-
abilities and, then, to designate the funds from that insurance
coverage settlement as the sole source of recovery for workers
with tort claims against Fibreboard in the future.5 As the Ortiz
Court repeatedly noted, the net worth of Fibreboard above and
beyond its insurance coverage-what damage claimants clearly
could have attempted to tap in ordinary tort litigation-would
have remained largely untouched. 6
The Ortiz Court underscored the stringent demands that
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) places upon those who would mandate member-
ship in a class based upon the existence of a limited fund to sat-
isfy extant damage claims.57 Drawing heavily on early equity
cases,58 the Court emphasized that a mandatory class under Rule
23(b)(1)(B) turns upon proof of a true limited fund-a fund set
definitely at its maximum,59 rather than one, like that in Ortiz,
whose purported limit consisted of nothing more than the say-so
' 527 US 815 (1999).521 US at 597.
Id at 620.
' 527 US at 821-22, 829-830.
Id at 822-25.
Id at 859-60.
Ortiz, 527 US at 838-48
Id at 834-37.
,' Id at 838.
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of the settling parties." In addition, the Court drew from the eq-
uity precedents the further limitation that the limited fund must
be distributed entirely to the members of the mandatory class.6'
The structure of the transaction struck down in Ortiz-an
attempt to use a mandatory class settlement to cap liability at
insurance limits-is a matter to which I shall return in connec-
tion with the 9/11 Fund legislation. For now, the point is that
Ortiz posits heightened procedural demands for the certification
of a mandatory class.62 That is hardly surprising, given that a
mandatory class, by definition, dispenses with the check upon the
dealmakers that the right to opt out otherwise would bring. For
the designers of class settlements, the holdings in Amchem and
Ortiz virtually invite efforts to gain the certainty of a mandatory
class while satisfying only the comparatively less demanding pro-
cedural hurdles that apply to an opt-out class. The challenge, in
sum, lies in deterring the exercise of the right to opt out.
An additional dimension of Amchem and Ortiz bears mention
here. The Supreme Court's decisions in both cases came at the
behest of class settlement objectors consisting of law firms within
the asbestos plaintiffs' bar other than class counsel.63 The opt-out
class settlement in Amchem and the mandatory class settlement
in Ortiz threatened the business prospects of these competing
firms within the asbestos plaintiffs' bar-hence, their willingness
to spearhead the procedural challenges to the class settlements
all the way to the nation's highest court. The nature of that
threat is sometimes mischaracterized in the academic literature,
which has tended to focus on side payments made by the settling
defendants to class counsel to resolve the latter's pending asbes-
tos cases 6 -claims not within the class definition in either case.
The story often told in the academic literature is of class counsel
receiving a lucrative payoff for their pending asbestos cases in
exchange for their willingness to sign on to an inadequate class
settlement that would bind future claimants.65 The problem with
' Id at 848.
, Ortiz, 527 US at 839.
Id at 838-47.
See Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 Mich L Rev 899,
962-63 (1996) (discussing the leading role played by the Dallas law firm of Baron & Budd
in the successful campaign to derail the Amchem class settlement).
"' See, for example, John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 Colum L Rev 1343, 1394 (1995); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the
Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc, 80 Cornell L Rev 1045, 1064-65 (1995).
' See, for example, Coffee, 95 Colum L Rev at 1394 (cited in note 64); Koniak, 80
Cornell L Rev at 1064-65 (cited in note 64).
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this story is that defendants did not offer such side payments
uniquely to class counsel in Amchem or Ortiz but, rather, offered
similar terms for the resolution of pending cases filed by other
asbestos plaintiffs' law firms as well.6
A threat to competing asbestos plaintiffs' law firms was in-
deed present in Amchem and Ortiz, but it was of a more subtle
variety than the one often described: the threat was that class
counsel would receive a substantial and immediate payoff-the
side payments for their pending cases, plus a fee award from
their representation of the respective classes-and then would
deploy those funds in new areas of civil litigation involving mat-
ters other than asbestos.67 The threat, in short, was to leave the
asbestos area to the competitors of class counsel under less at-
tractive terms than had previously prevailed in the litigation and,
at the same time, to gain a competitive advantage in capitaliza-
tion for purposes of new, lucrative areas of litigation.
The larger implication from the schisms within the plaintiffs'
bar that precipitated the decisions in Amchem and Ortiz is this:
class settlement designers have reason to find ways to prevent
competing plaintiffs' law firms from undercutting their deal,
whether by engaging in a campaign to induce opt-outs or by de-
railing the approval of the class settlement in the manner of the
successful objectors who took their concerns all the way to the
Supreme Court. An important dimension of a class settlement, in
short, consists of the rivalries among persons whom one initially
might think to be in the same camp-rivalries not unlike those
among the various organized crime families in The Godfather, all
nominally aligned on the same side of the law.
II. CLOSURE THROUGH OPT-OUT DETERRENCE
To discern a principled line between permissible and imper-
missible deterrent devices for opt-out class settlements, this Part
draws upon three real-world examples: the 9/11 Fund legislation
enacted by Congress in the fall of 2001; the Agent Orange class
settlement from the mid-1980s; and efforts in recent years to de-
sign a class settlement in the Sulzer hip implant litigation. These
are by no means the only examples that one might use to explore
' See Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class
Action, 115 Harv L Rev 747, 777 n 122 (2002).
" For development of this point, see Nagareda, 94 Mich L Rev at 936-37 (cited in
note 63).
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the deterrence of the right to opt out. They nonetheless suffice to
enable one to draw some revealing inferences, not just about
similarities to events in The Godfather but, more importantly,
about which kinds of deterrent devices the law should permit and
which it should not.
Opt-Out Deterrence in Class Settlements and Legislation
9/11 Fund Sulzer Hip Agent Orange
Legislation Implant Class Class
Settlement Settlement
(original ver-
sion)
Opt-Out Cap on airline Prospect of ob- Prospect of ob-
Deterrent liability at in- taining no re- taining no re-
surance limits covery due to covery due to
(permissible in lien on Sulzer's inability to
legislation but assets in favor prove causation
generally not in of trust created
a class settle- by the settle-
ment, per ment to fund
Ortiz) compensation
for the class
Benefits Administrative Administrative Administrative
for Re- compensation compensation compensation
maining at amounts set at amounts pursuant to
in the by Special Mas- described in settlement
Class ter, with pay- settlement
outs backed by
U.S. Treasury
The 9/11 Fund legislation and the Agent Orange litigation pro-
vide the most straightforward starting point for analysis.
A. The 9/11 Fund Legislation
The 9/11 Fund legislation arose from expectations of an in-
flux of conventional tort suits by the victims of the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks or their survivors against the airlines that
operated the fatal flights.68 Although Congress arguably might
See Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm in the Context of September 11, 88
Va L Rev 1831, 1835 (2002).
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have chosen to preempt completely state tort law with regard to
such suits against the airlines, Congress chose a less drastic pol-
icy course. Congress left open the avenue of conventional tort
suits, but Congress made such litigation less attractive to victims
and created a streamlined alternative regime for compensation.
Specifically, victims still may sue the airlines, but the 9/11 Fund
legislation caps airline liability in conventional civil litigation at
the limits of airline insurance coverage and restricts victims'
choice of forum to a single federal district court.69 As an alterna-
tive to litigation under those limitations, the legislation enables
victims to opt instead for compensation under a federal adminis-
trative regime backed by the credit of the United States Treas-
70ury.
Whether the 9/11 Fund legislation represents enlightened
public policy is a question that scholars surely will debate for
years to come. My point here goes not to policy efficacy but to le-
gal authority. Duly exercising its legislative power under Article I
of the Constitution,7' Congress clearly had the authority to enact
the 9/11 Fund legislation. Pursuant to the Commerce Clause,72
Congress may both create a federal administrative regime for
compensation and discourage the pursuit of conventional tort liti-
gation by altering victims' preexisting rights to sue. The cap on
liability at the limits of insurance coverage imposed by the 9/11
Fund legislation is the analogue in the legislative sphere to the
cap that the Ortiz Court held could not be imposed by a class set-
tlement absent the existence of a true limited fund.73 In terms of
its effect upon conventional litigation, a class settlement cannot
do everything that Congress itself might do through duly enacted
legislation.
All of this is not to say, however, that the prospects for indi-
vidual lawsuits by the would-be members of a class must remain
rosy in the face of a class settlement. To the contrary, the process
for judicial approval of a class settlement under Rule 23(e) often
will bring to light information that sheds some-perhaps, consid-
erable-doubt upon the viability of conventional lawsuits.74 Spe-
cifically, in the course of determining whether a class settlement
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, § 408(a) & (b)(3), 115 Stat
at 240-41.
71 Id at § 405, 115 Stat at 238-40.
71 US Const Art I, § 1.
72 Id at § 8, cl 3.
7' See Part I.
See, for example, Agent Orange settlement discussed in Part B.
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is "fair, reasonable, and adequate" for purposes of Rule 23(e),"5
the reviewing court inevitably will reflect upon the viability of
class members' claims in conventional litigation.76 One can ascer-
tain whether a class settlement is a "fair, reasonable, and ade-
quate" deal, after all, only by thinking about what class members
must relinquish in exchange. The next section addresses a class
settlement scenario of this sort.
B. The Agent Orange Class Settlement
The Agent Orange litigation presents a vivid-and, for devo-
tees of class actions, relatively familiar-example of a class action
precipitating judicial reflection upon the dubiousness of the
plaintiffs' claims on the merits. The litigation culminated in an
opt-out class settlement under Rule 23(b)(3) that created a fund
for compensation of military personnel exposed to the defoliant
Agent Orange during their service in the Vietnam War.77 Speak-
ing with class counsel during settlement negotiations on the eve
of trial, Judge Jack Weinstein underscored his formidable doubts
about the causation element of plaintiffs' case." Later, as part of
his decision to approve the class settlement under Rule 23(e),
Judge Weinstein pointedly noted that the available evidence on
the existence of a causal link between Agent Orange and the
maladies suffered by the plaintiff class would not have been suffi-
cient to support tort recovery.79 The Agent Orange class settle-
ment was a good deal, in short, because class members were quite
likely to end up completely empty-handed in conventional tort
litigation. Indeed, in the few instances of opt-outs from the class
settlement, Judge Weinstein, true to his word, ultimately granted
summary judgment for the defendants based upon the absence of
a triable issue on the causation element."
" Though not currently part of Rule 23(e) by its terms, the mantra "fair, reasonable,
and adequate" is the standard applied by courts in determining whether to approve a class
settlement under that rule. See Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) § 30.42 at 238 (Fed
Judicial Center 1995).
76 See Part B.
" In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F Supp 740, 747 (E D NY
1984).
" See Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial at 160-61 (quoting sworn statement of class
counsel) (cited in note 19).
71 In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F Supp at 795.
'8 In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F Supp 1223, 1264 (E D NY
1985).
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Revelations that class members might well encounter barri-
ers to successful conventional suits undoubtedly deter the exer-
cise of the right to opt out in a sense. But it is equally clear that
this sort of deterrence-if one can call it that at all-must be
permissible in order for opt-out class settlements ever to be vi-
able. In the Agent Orange litigation, the class settlement itself
effected no alteration whatsoever of class members' legal rights.
The settlement did not cap the defendants' liability, for example,
but merely precipitated a line of inquiry that highlighted a preex-
isting barrier to successful tort suits. The proceedings on the
class settlement exposed the dearth of evidence on the causation
element of the plaintiffs' case; but the settlement itself did not
create that deficiency. Under these circumstances, the class set-
tlement was genuinely an offer too good for class members to re-
fuse."'
C. The Sulzer Hip Implant Class Settlement
Bearing in mind the two straightforward examples of the
9/11 legislation and the Agent Orange class settlement, one may
turn to a harder case from recent times. The Sulzer hip implant
litigation arose from the discovery of a manufacturing defect in
one component within a larger medical device designed to replace
the hip joint.82 The defendant manufacturer recalled the defective
units but not until after thousands of them already had been im-
planted in patients across the country.83 Some patients stood to
recover large damage awards, having already undergone "revi-
sion" surgery to correct the problems caused by the manufactur-
ing defect or needing such surgery in the future.84 The substantial
majority of implant recipients, however, had only modest damage
claims, at best, having experienced no problems with their hip
implants and needing only minimal medical screening to confirm
that revision surgery would be unnecessary."
The challenge for class counsel and Sulzer lay in the design
of an opt-out class settlement that would deter the high-value
damage claimants from leaving the class. Sulzer pursued this
objective not only in the terms of the class settlement itself-
" If anything, one might question Judge Weinstein's tenaciousness in encouraging
the defendants to settle in the face of the formidable doubts about causation.
8 Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liability Litigation, 204 FRD 330, 335 (N D Ohio 2001).
Id.
Id at 335-36.
Id at 348.
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about which I will have more to say-but also in its choice of bar-
gaining agent. Sulzer retained as its class settlement negotiator
Dickie Scruggs, a nationally renowned plaintiffs' lawyer from
Mississippi who previously had taken a leading role in the legal
assault against the tobacco industry, among other targets of mass
tort litigation.86 Sulzer's objective in retaining Scruggs reportedly
was to use his stature in the eyes of his fellow plaintiffs' lawyers
as a selling point for a class settlement that would bring closure
to the hip implant litigation.87
In this regard, Sulzer's approach borrowed, apparently un-
consciously, from the Barzini family's recruitment of a subordi-
nate within the Corleone family. The idea was to recruit an in-
sider within the plaintiffs' bar to convince his cohorts to support
the hip implant class settlement by foregoing an opt-out cam-
paign. For Scruggs himself, the prospect of switching to the de-
fense side for purposes of the hip implant litigation was very
much a "business," not a "personal," matter." Scruggs reportedly
stood to be paid "a 'low seven-figure number,' plus a 'success fee'
of about $20 million should the settlement be approved."'
Sulzer had good reason to try to ingratiate itself with the
plaintiffs' bar, even at the cost of paying twenty million dollars to
Scruggs. That reason stemmed from the deal that Sulzer sought
to strike in a class settlement designed to deter the would-be
members of the class-especially, the high-value claimants in
need of revision surgery-from opting out. The class settlement
would have established a trust to fund compensation payments to
class members."0 This trust fund would have consisted, in es-
sence, of the cash that Sulzer could assemble while still maintain-
ing itself as a going concern."' Specifically, Sulzer would have
committed to the trust fund its insurance proceeds, its available
cash (but for one month of working capital), a specified number of
shares, plus one-half of its net annual income until the payment
Curriden, 87 ABA J at 18 (cited in note 26).
87 Id.
Before being led to his death on the orders of Michael Corleone, the traitor Tessio
utters his famous last words: "Tell Mike it was only business. I always liked him." These
words recall earlier scenes in The Godfather in which members of the Corleone family
distinguish sharply between desirable actions that advance the "business" interests of the
family and undesirable actions that serve mere "personal" vendettas. The Godfather
(Paramount 1972).
8 Jess Bravin, Sulzer Medica Reaches Novel Class-Action Pact, Wall St J A3 (Aug 16,
2001).
' Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis, 204 FRD at 351.
91 Id.
[2003:
1411 CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 159
of all benefits promised in the class settlement.92 Though sizeable,
the trust fund nonetheless left the other assets of Sulzer essen-
tially undisturbed-a far-from-incidental consequence, the sig-
nificance of which will emerge momentarily.
In addition, the class settlement would have placed a lien on
all of Sulzer's assets in favor of the trust fund for the class.93 In
practical terms, the effect of the lien would have been to delay the
payment of any settlement or damage award in favor of any opt-
out claimant for a period of roughly six years-the time expected
for the completion of payouts to class members by the trust.94
When describing this deal to the Wall Street Journal, Scruggs
painted an even darker picture for opt-out claimants: "[I]f any-
body opts out, they still have to try their case, win their case, win
their appeal, and then there would be no assets to satisfy their
judgment, because they are all pledged to the class.""
In fact, the prioritizing of class members over opt-out claim-
ants was the sole purpose of the lien. In a revealing loophole, the
class settlement agreement provided that Sulzer could sell its
assets for other "business purposes" free and clear of the lien, as
long as the proceeds from any such sales were not used to pay
opt-out claimants.96
But just as the Corleones sniffed out the real agenda behind
the rival Barzini family's invitation, so too did rival firms within
the plaintiffs' bar successfully object to the original Sulzer class
settlement. The objectors were led by a prominent plaintiffs' law
firm that earlier sought unsuccessfully to assume leadership of
the hip implant litigation nationwide.97 The objectors' motives
went beyond a mere "personal" vendetta against class counsel;
rather, their motives were eminently "business"-related.
The objectors had already obtained as their clients in conven-
tional tort litigation a significant proportion of the high-value
Id.
9' Id at 352.
Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis, 204 FRD at 352 n 23.
' Bravin, Sulzer Medica, Wall St J at A3 (cited in note 89) (quoting Scruggs).
Class Action Settlement Agreement Among Sulzer Orthopedics and Affiliated Enti-
ties Including Sulzer Medica Ltd. and Class Counsel on Behalf of Class Representatives
§ 2.9(f) (Aug 23, 2001), Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis, 204 FRD at 530 [on file with U Chi Legal
F].
" See Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis, 204 FRD at 336 n 5 ("Interestingly, Richard Heimann
is one of the attorneys who filed a motion for consolidation ... [and] is now one of the most
vocal objectors.").
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revision surgery claimants.!8 For the objectors, the prospect of
simply opting these clients out of the class settlement would have
been to little avail, for they then would have been subject to the
lien in favor of the class consciously designed, in Scruggs's words,
to leave opt-outs with "no assets to satisfy [a] judgment. " " The
class settlement thus portended for the objecting firms and their
high-value claimant clients something roughly analogous to what
the Barzini meeting invitation portended for Michael Corleone:
death, if not literally, then figuratively in terms of the objecting
law firms' ability to profit from their previous efforts to identify
and recruit the most promising claims in the hip implant litiga-
tion.
The objectors initially lost in federal district court, which ap-
proved the class settlement as fair under Rule 23(e); ' ° but the
objectors then appealed to the Sixth Circuit. In ruling upon a pre-
liminary motion in connection with the appeal, the Sixth Circuit
intimated that it had "serious doubts as to the legitimacy of the
class settlement."1 1 Before the appellate court could rule on the
merits, however, class counsel and their defense counterparts
returned to the negotiating table and crafted a new class settle-
ment agreement that notably eliminated both the trust fund and
the lien feature in the original deal.0 The class settlement in its
original form nonetheless serves as a useful pedagogical tool with
which to identify the kinds of opt-out deterrents the law should
permit and those that it should not. After identifying these deter-
rents, I shall speak briefly of how the changes made to the Sulzer
class settlement terms shed light on the right to opt out.
At first glance, the lien feature of the original Sulzer hip im-
plant settlement might appear similar to the Agent Orange set-
tlement in the sense of positing an alternative so attractive as to
induce class members to forego conventional lawsuits. The lien
certainly would have enhanced the assurance to class members
that the assets of Sulzer would not be dissipated over time
See Petitioners' Consolidated Brief in Support of Appeal Pursuant to FRCP 23(f)
and FRAP 5, at 3-4, In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Product Liability Litigation, Nos 01-303
and 01-304 (6th Cir 2001) [on file with the U Chi Legal F].
Bravin, Sulzer Medica, Wall St J at A3 (cited in note 89).
Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis, 204 FRD at 335.
In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Product Liability Litigation, 2001 US App LEXIS
25910, *5 (6th Cir 2001).
" Class Action Settlement Agreement Among Sulzer Orthopedics Inc, Sulzer Medica
AG, Sulzer AG, and Class Counsel on Behalf of Class Representatives (Mar 13, 2002),
available online at <http://www.sulzerimplantsettlement.com/classactionsettlement.htm>
(visited Mar 22, 2003).
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through conventional lawsuits brought by opt-out claimants. But
the boosting of benefits to class members in this manner was not
the sole effect of the class settlement. Rather, that boost would
have come only as part and parcel of an alteration of hip implant
patients' rights, even those of patients who chose to stand outside
of the class.
Absent the class settlement, damage claimants against Sul-
zer stood vis-A-vis one another in a race to recover against the
assets of the corporation. By invoking the image of a "race," I
mean quite literally that, without the class settlement, any given
damage claimant stood at risk that another claimant might leap-
frog ahead of her to obtain actual payment from Sulzer's assets.
There is room in this race, moreover, for the granting of security
interests-what any lien provides the lien holder vis-A-vis other
creditors. Any given damage claimant stood at risk that Sulzer
might convey a security interest in some or all of its assets to
other persons-whether business creditors or, conceivably, par-
ticular persons with damage claims against the corporation. °3
But even such a creation of security interests in corporate assets
would have assumed a race-like quality. Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code provides that the first perfected security inter-
est in a given asset shall have priority over the second, and so
forth.104 First in time, first in right.
In theory, absent the class action, Sulzer might have granted
security interests in its assets to would-be damage claimants on
an individual basis, generating an elaborate priority scheme
based upon their relative order of perfection under Article 9.'°5
But the one kind of creditor to whom damage claimants did not
stand to lose the race for Sulzer's assets is the creditor literally
brought into being by the original class settlement:' namely, the
trust fund as the recipient of the security interest conveyed by
the lien.
The original class settlement would have altered the rules of
the race by effectively providing class members as a class with a
security interest in the assets of Sulzer. The effect of the lien-
indeed, its only effect, given the loophole for sales of corporate
assets for other "business purposes"-would have been to prevent
" See Sulzer Settlement Agreement (cited in note 96) (discussing effect of lien); UCC§ 9-322(a) (Foundation 2002) (discussing priority of conflicting security interests).
" UCC § 9-322(a)(1).
105 Id.
" Sulzer Class Action Settlement Agreement (cited in note 96).
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opt-out claimants from doing what they remained perfectly enti-
tled to do before the class settlement: specifically, to try to leap-
frog ahead of other would-be damage claimants for ultimate
payment from the Sulzer assets. And the way that the class set-
tlement would have effected this restructuring of damage claim-
ants' rights was to bring into being a legal entity, the trust fund,
in the same way that the class settlement designers in Ortiz pur-
ported to bring into being a limited fund: namely, by the mere
say-so of the class settlement agreement, not by reference to any-
thing antecedent to the class itself. In this manner, the original
class settlement attempted in the Sulzer hip implant litigation
suffered from the same fatal circularity in its justification as the
faux limited fund in Ortiz."7
In fact, the original Sulzer deal is exactly what one would
predict would be attempted in the aftermath of Ortiz. In struc-
tural terms, the original Sulzer class settlement sought to deter
opt-outs not merely by positing an attractive alternative avenue
for payment (as in the Agent Orange class settlement), but also
by altering the preexisting rights of hip implant patients (in a
manner analogous to the liability cap imposed by Congress in the
9/11 Fund legislation)."8 Had the original class settlement suc-
ceeded in its ambition to deter opt-outs, the practical effect would
have been to cap the liability of Sulzer at the pot of cash it obli-
gated to the trust fund-a sizeable sum that nonetheless fell glar-
ingly short of Sulzer's net worth. As such, the original deal would
have enabled class counsel and their defense counterparts to ob-
tain, in practical effect, the closure of a mandatory class settle-
ment without having to satisfy the demand of Ortiz for proof of a
true limited fund set at the "maximum"' 9 that Sulzer could pay.1
The twenty million dollars "success fee" that would then have
been due to Scruggs would have been a mere pittance to pay for
such all-encompassing closure in the hip implant litigation.
For reasons that I explore in greater depth in a companion
article,"' the district court largely missed the effect that the origi-
nal class settlement would have had upon the preexisting rights
"' Compare Sulzer Class Action Settlement Agreement (cited in note 96) with Ortiz,
527 US at 848.
0.. Sulzer Class Action Settlement Agreement (cited in note 96).
Ortiz, 527 US at 838-39 (pointing out that the most distinctive characteristic of a
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) case is that the maximum total of aggregated liquidated damages is
greater than the maximum total funds available to satisfy them).
"0 Bravin, Sulzer Medica, Wall St J at A3 (cited in note 89).
.. See Nagareda, 103 Colum L Rev at 213-216 (cited in note 21).
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of hip implant patients and, for that matter, the subtlety of the
settlement designers' effort to evade Ortiz. The changes made to
the deal under the threat of reversal on appeal nonetheless help
to frame the consequences of an insistence upon the right to opt
out as a vehicle to preserve preexisting rights. The major change
consists of more cash for the class in the form of boosts in the
payout amounts provided by the class settlement, particularly for
high-value claimants."2 This comes as little surprise. Absent the
ability to deter opt-outs by detrimentally altering their preexist-
ing rights in ordinary civil litigation, the designers of a class set-
tlement can deter only by enhancing the relative attractiveness of
the alternative bundle of rights that they hold out for the class-
here, the sums from which the objecting law firms stood to take
their contingency fees for the representation of high-value claims
under the class settlement. For its part, the district court blessed
the final version of the deal,"1 and the period for the filing of an
appeal has since run.
D. Institutional Lessons
Within the foregoing comparison of class settlement ar-
rangements lurks a deeper institutional point: namely, that the
authority to alter legal rights through the vehicle of a class set-
tlement must stop short of the Article I authority that Congress
might choose to wield to alter rights by way of legislation. Out-
side the special scenario of a limited fund as delineated in Ortiz,
the class action device has no authority to alter the preexisting
rights of class members in the manner of duly enacted legislation.
An opt-out class settlement crosses this line. It becomes an offer
that class members cannot refuse in the sinister sense of The
Godfather when it seeks to do what Congress itself has done in
the 9/11 Fund legislation: to induce people to relinquish their
preexisting rights to sue not simply by positing an attractive al-
ternative avenue for redress but also by altering those rights
themselves.
The basis for a distinction between class actions and legisla-
tion ultimately rests upon an underlying conception of legitimate
... In re Sulzer Hip Prosthesis and Knee Prosthesis Liability Litigation, No 1:01-CV-
9000, slip op at 3 (N D Ohio Mar 14, 2002) (table comparing original and final class set-
tlements), available online at <http://www.hipimplantlaw.com/pdf/20020314_memoand_
order.pdf> (visited Mar 22, 2003).
113 Id.
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lawmaking processes."4 The emergence of the class action as a
transactional device for the sale of class members' rights to sue
accentuates the tension between class actions and conventional
lawmaking institutions, for the substitution of rights posited by a
class settlement amounts to a kind of mini-legislation. Yet, that
substitution takes place at the behest not of politically account-
able representatives but, rather, class counsel as the self-
appointed bargaining agents for the class.
To be sure, a court must approve a class settlement under
Rule 23(e) for it to have preclusive effect. 5 But, as both commen-
tators and judges themselves have long recognized, courts oper-
ate at a distinct informational disadvantage in the class settle-
ment review process by comparison to the attorneys who seek
judicial blessings for their deals.116 Even the most conscientious of
courts, moreover, must undertake class settlement review against
the sirens' call to sign off on the deal as a means of docket clear-
ance. 7 As a result, the presence of judicial review in the class
settlement process serves, at best, as a highly imperfect source of
regulation.
The right to opt out, by contrast, posits a different kind of
check upon the deal-making power of class counsel, one whereby
damage claimants with claims marketable on an individual basis
can obtain an alternative bargaining agent whose self-interest is
not tied to the representation of the class claims on a collective
basis."8 In the Sulzer hip implant litigation, this check proved
especially powerful, because many of the persons with the most
marketable claims-implant recipients in need of revision sur-
"' See generally Stephen C. Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern
Class Action 198-206 (Yale 1987) (comparing legislation and group litigation).
"' See Kionoff and Bilich, Class Actions at 583 (cited in note 5) (discussing procedure
surrounding class action settlements).
... Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 Va L Rev 1051,
1105 (1996) (arguing that judges learn of settlement flaws from objectors in adversarial
fairness hearings); Kamilewicz v Bank of Boston Corp, 100 F3d 1348, 1352 (7th Cir 1996)
(Easterbrook dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (warning of danger of represen-
tative plaintiffs and their lawyers putting on a "staged performance" in fairness hearings).
117 Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 UC Davis L Rev 805, 829 (1997).
1' In their capacity to review class settlements for fairness under Rule 23(e) and to
make fee awards to class counsel for the class representation, courts act as regulatory
bodies along the lines of public utility commissions. The right to opt out, by contrast, in-
jects a market-based check upon the deal-making power wielded by class counsel over the
rights of class members. For further development of this argument by reference to the
economic literature on monopoly regulation, see Nagareda, 103 Colum L Rev at 163-175
(cited in note 21).
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gery--already had counsel eager to litigate their cases on an in-
dividual basis."19
Once one sees the class action as it actually operates-as a
rival institution for law reform rather than a framework for
trial"'2 -the deals effectuated by class settlements come to impli-
cate competing notions of legal representation. In private law,
contracts stand as the vehicles for transactions involving the sale
of legal rights. Only the owner of a right, or an agent to whom the
owner has delegated bargaining power, can sell that right. Seen
in this light, the original Sulzer class settlement was particularly
suspect, for it effectively would have replaced the sales agents
with whom large numbers of revision surgery patients had actu-
ally contracted for representation with a far less reliable sales
agent, class counsel, whose bargaining authority stemmed, at
best, only from an implied delegation of power under Rule 23.21
Implied delegations are not foreign to the law, of course. In
public law-the world of government-alterations of preexisting
rights are contractual only in the attenuated sense of consent by
the populace as a whole to a scheme of political representation. 2 1
In the public realm, the legitimacy of representation stems not so
much from a contract as from features of the political process it-
self-principally, the opportunity to remove elected representa-
tives from power at some later time. 23 Drawing upon concepts of
representation in political theory, Stephen Yeazell has observed
that the modern class action operates in a shadowy, gray area
between the contractual notions of representation familiar to pri-
vate law and ideals of political representation in public law. 4
The right to opt out effectively enables high-value damage claim-
ants to insist upon the contractual sort of representation familiar
in private law.
.. See Petitioners' Consolidated Brief in Support of Appeal Pursuant to FRCP 23(f)
and FRAP 5, at 3-4, In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Product Liability Litigation, Nos 01-303
and 01-304 (6th Cir 2001) (cited in note 98).
Rubenstein, 89 Georgetown L J 371 (cited in note 8).
12 See Nagareda, 103 Colum L Rev at 189-199 (cited in note 21) (discussing Rule 23
as an implied delegation of bargaining power).
"2 In textual terms, congressional lawmaking power under Article I stems from a
delegation of power from "the People" collectively. US Const Art I, § 2, cl 1. For an insight-
ful argument linking the legitimacy of the Constitution as a whole to notions of consent to
a process for lawmaking that accords protection to individual rights, see Randy E. Bar-
nett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 Colum L Rev 111 (2003).
" Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation at 199-200 (cited in note 114).
4 Id at 198-206.
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Why should that be so? The reason stems from an abiding
sense that class counsel are neither fish nor fowl-neither the
contractual agents of class members nor their political represen-
tatives. If anything, the problem is not that the deal-making
power of class counsel is too sweeping but, rather, that it is too
narrow. The sale of rights by way of a class settlement is literally
a one-shot deal. It is not part of an ongoing series of policy deci-
sions amenable to logrolling in the manner of the legislative proc-
ess. As such, the deal struck by any given class settlement must
be justified, if at all, only by reference to what is bought and sold
in that transaction. 12' The right to opt out operates to ensure that
there is genuine exchange-real buying and selling-rather than
unilateral appropriation of class members' preexisting rights in
whole or in part.
Unilateral appropriation was the essence of both the class
settlement properly struck down in Ortiz and the deal originally
attempted in the Sulzer hip implant litigation.2 ' Both would have
taken away a portion of claimants' preexisting rights even if they
opted out of the class: in Ortiz, the right to levy against the net
worth of Fibreboard beyond its insurance coverage, and in the hip
implant litigation, the prospect of leapfrogging other individual
damage claimants to obtain payment from the assets of Sulzer. If
anything, one can understand the dollar boosts ultimately made
in the Sulzer class settlement as reflecting-albeit, in a rough,
back-of-the-envelope manner-the purchase price for class mem-
bers' right to leapfrog. The point, however, lies not so much in the
specific calculation of that price but, rather, in the underlying
premise that a price must be paid-that would-be class members'
rights really must be purchased, not appropriated.
The proposition that the defendant must pay to purchase
damage claimants' preexisting rights nonetheless leads to a fur-
ther question concerning efforts to deter opt-outs: namely, why
pay the actual holders of rights to sue in the form of generous
payouts under the class settlement? Why not, instead, pay some
lesser sum to class counsel's rivals within the plaintiffs' bar in
exchange for their agreement not to represent opt-out claimants
in the future? The goal, in short, would be to do figuratively to
the plaintiffs' law firms best positioned to represent opt-out
claimants what Michael Corleone did literally to the heads of the
" Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U Ill L Rev 43,
46 (1989).
"' Ortiz, 521 US at 828; Sulzer Class Action Settlement Agreement (cited in note 96).
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"five families" in The Godfather: to eliminate in one fell swoop the
threat that such rivals pose to the security of one's position,
whether as counsel for the plaintiff class or as the dominant or-
ganized crime family in New York. The next Part confronts the
challenge that this technique for closure would pose for the integ-
rity of the class action.
III. CLOSURE THROUGH ANTICOMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS
The idea of paying off the plaintiffs' law firms best positioned
to represent opt-out claimants to refrain from doing so is, I dare-
say, what one should expect to emerge as the next step in the
search for closure in opt-out class settlements. Close examination
of the Sulzer hip implant settlement virtually invites efforts
along these lines, for it unwittingly exposes the existence of an
increment of money thought necessary to deter opt-outs.127 The
next logical question for class settlement designers is how to re-
duce that increment in magnitude by paying it to someone other
than the class.
In the Sulzer hip implant litigation, the interests of high-
value claimants and those of the objecting law firms representing
them were closely aligned. Both would escape the lien and trust
fund of the original class settlement, or neither would. That
alignment of interests, however, arose from the happenstance
that prominent plaintiffs' law firms other than class counsel had
managed to recruit as their individual clients many of the most
lucrative claims that class counsel wanted to rope into the class.'
The ingenuity of what one might dub the "Michael Corleone solu-
tion" to the problem of closure is that it would drive a financial
wedge between the would-be class members most in need of an
alternate bargaining agent and the law firms best positioned to
serve in that role.
In fact, the ingenuity of the Michael Corleone solution runs
even deeper, for it manages to avoid altering the preexisting legal
rights of would-be opt-out claimants. If they opt out, then they
retain the same rights that they had prior to the class settlement.
They would be entitled to sue the defendant for damages and, if
27 See Bravin, Sulzer Medica, Wall St J at Al (cited in note 89) (noting that the set-
tlement tied up the company's assets in compensation for the class, thus hurting more
seriously injured plaintiffs who stood to opt out and win large damage awards).
" See Petitioners' Consolidated Brief in Support of Appeal Pursuant to FRCP 23(f)
and FRAP 5, at 3-4, In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Product Liability Litigation, 01-303 and
01-304 (6th Cir 2001) (cited in note 98).
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successful, to levy against the defendant's net worth, as necessary
to satisfy any judgment. They simply would have a hard time
finding a lawyer to help enforce their rights. Any plaintiffs' law
firm taking on such a representation would have to incur sub-
stantial costs to enter the litigation, as its lawyers would have to
familiarize themselves with the underlying factual and legal is-
sues from scratch. But in a civil justice system in which legal rep-
resentation remains allocated by the market, no aspiring plaintiff
for damages can credibly claim a legal entitlement to representa-
tion, much less to be represented by any particular firm within
the plaintiffs' bar.
A strategy of paying off the would-be representatives of opt-
out claimants builds upon settlements of non-class lawsuits in
the civil justice system. Though they have garnered relatively
little attention, agreements on the part of plaintiffs' counsel not
to represent similar persons in the future have formed a recur-
ring feature of non-class settlements in recent years. '29 In some
instances, these agreements have taken a subtle form, whereby
the settling defendant retains plaintiffs' counsel as a consultant
in order to create an ethical conflict of interest that would pre-
vent counsel from representing future persons in litigation
against the defendant. 30 The reason for such agreements is not
hard to discern. In any situation in which an initial plaintiff's
lawsuit concerns matters that are not idiosyncratic to that par-
ticular plaintiff-say, the safety of a widely-sold consumer prod-
uct-the defendant will fear that the payment of a settlement to
that initial plaintiff simply will invite similar lawsuits in the fu-
ture. Agreements not to represent similar plaintiffs thus are in
keeping with other controversial features of non-class civil set-
'" Geyelin, Some Companies Pay, Wall St J at B1 (cited in note 30). To put the point
mildly, the law of professional responsibility raises serious questions about the permissi-
bility of such agreements as an ethical matter. See, for example, Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, Rule 5.6(b) (Foundation 2000) ("A lawyer shall not participate in offering
or making ... an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part
of the settlement of a client controversy."); Model Code of Professional Responsibility, DR
2-108(B) (Foundation 2000) ("In connection with the settlement of a controversy or suit, a
lawyer shall not enter into an agreement that restricts his right to practice law."); Re-
statement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 13(2) (ALI 2000) ("In settling a client
claim, a lawyer may not offer or enter into an agreement that restricts the right of the
lawyer to practice law, including the right to represent or take particular action on behalf
of other clients."); ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op
93-371 (Apr 16, 1993) ("[A] lawyer may not offer, nor may opposing counsel accept, a set-
tlement agreement which would obligate the latter to limit the representation of future
claimants.").
" Geyelin, Some Companies Pay, Wall St J at B1 (cited in note 30).
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tlements-such as agreements to seal the court records in the
initial case' 3 -designed to prevent a first lawsuit from turning
into thousands.
Extension of agreements not to sue to the class settlement
context would give rise to additional complexity. The plaintiffs'
law firms about which the defendant must worry consist not of
class counsel-with whom the defendant already will have struck
a deal in the class settlement-but, rather, of other law firms
with involvement in the litigation prior to the class settlement,
such as would be positioned to represent opt-out claimants with
only minimal additional costs. The identification of those firms is
unlikely to prove difficult, however. In fact, an institutional fea-
ture of complex civil litigation unwittingly might assist in that
enterprise.
Class settlements often take place in the aftermath of the
consolidation by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
("MDL Panel") of related lawsuits pending in the federal courts."2
The choice of the federal district court in which to consolidate
pre-trial proceedings can be highly contentious, with the debate
over that question serving as a surrogate for an underlying dis-
pute within the plaintiffs' bar over which firm (or consortium of
firms) will assume leadership of the consolidated litigation.'33 The
lead law firm on the plaintiffs' side tends to emerge as the natu-
ral negotiating partner for a defendant interested in putting the
entire litigation behind it by entering into a class settlement.' At
that point, the defendant and class counsel interested in imple-
menting the Michael Corleone solution need only refer back to
the proceedings before the MDL Panel to generate a roster of the
potential rival firms to be paid off.
Though undeniably tempting as a strategic matter for the
dealmakers behind a class settlement, the Michael Corleone solu-
"' A small number of federal and state courts presumptively prohibit the sealing of
court records as part of a civil settlement. See Eric Frazier, Judges Veto Sealed Deals,
Natl L J Al, A10 (Aug 12, 2002). For an argument in favor of allowing the settling parties
to opt for secrecy, see Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public
Access to the Courts, 105 Harv L Rev 427, 491-94 (1991).
,3 The consolidation power of the MDL Panel flows from 28 USC § 1407(a) (1994).
For illustrative MDL Panel proceedings, see In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants
Products Liability Litigation, 793 F Supp 1098, 1100-01 (JPML 1992) (characterizing the
contending law firms' arguments over the choice of district court as "fueled by an acrimo-
nious dispute among counsel, relating to control of the litigation"); In re Asbestos Product
Liability Litigation, 771 F Supp 415, 420 (JPML 1992) (noting that the dispute over trans-
fer stemmed from "differing (and often inconsistent) visions" of the litigation).
" Rubenstein, 89 Georgetown L J at 420 (cited in note 8).
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tion nonetheless should not rise to legitimacy in the eyes of the
law governing class actions any more than it should, in its blood-
ier form, in the eyes of the law applicable to organized crime. In
economic terms, the Michael Corleone solution effectively trans-
fers wealth to class counsel's competitors within the plaintiffs'
bar from the actual holders of rights to sue whose compensation
the class settlement otherwise would have to boost in order to
induce them to remain in the class. If allowed to take place, such
a transfer would turn the conventional justification for a damage
class action on its head. It would convert the class action from a
procedural device to bundle together related damage claims and
thereby to enable claimants to capture the gains to be had from
resolution of the litigation as a whole into a vehicle largely for
rent extraction by the plaintiffs' bar. The hard question about the
Michael Corleone solution is not whether it should be permitted
but, rather, what is the appropriate institutional vehicle to en-
force a prohibition.
One relatively straightforward part of any solution-but only
a part-would be for reviewing courts under Rule 23(e) to adopt a
per se rule that the existence of side agreements to pay off the
would-be representatives of opt-out claimants should doom judi-
cial approval of a class settlement. The point is not that class set-
tlement designers somehow must look out for the well-being of
opt-out claimants; rather, side agreements to implement the Mi-
chael Corleone solution stand as compelling evidence that the
terms of the settlement for the class members are not "fair, rea-
sonable, and adequate."3 5
Consideration of any such side agreements would mark only
a modest step from the inquiry that the Supreme Court in Am-
chem and Ortiz already has prescribed for the class settlement
review process.' 36 In both cases, the Court pointed with trepida-
tion to the existence of side agreements by which the settling de-
fendants resolved the pending asbestos cases represented by class
counsel in the tort system on terms different from those applica-
ble to the Amchem and Ortiz classes of future asbestos claim-
ants.'37 Whether that trepidation was justified in the particular
' Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) § 30, 42 at 28 (cited in note 75).
See Amchem, 521 US at 620 (emphasizing that the protection of absent plaintiffs
demands courts' heightened attention in settlement-only certifications); Ortiz, 527 US at
838-47 (detailing the required characteristics of a class needed to justify a 23(b)(1)(B)
class certification).
' Amchem, 521 US at 601; Ortiz, 527 US at 852.
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contexts of Amchem and Ortiz is a matter of some dispute, as I
suggested earlier."8 For present purposes, the point is simply that
Amchem and Ortiz already recognize the importance of scrutiniz-
ing side agreements to the class settlement. A proposed amend-
ment to Rule 23(e) would write this notion into the text of the
class action rule itself.'
Nonetheless, judicial review is only a partial solution at best.
The class action literature in recent years documents wide varia-
tions in the scrutiny accorded to class settlements by reviewing
courts, particularly those in a small number of state courts in
localities notorious as magnets for class settlements. 140 Anoma-
lously lax courts aside, a per se rule against the approval of a
class settlement struck in tandem with the Michael Corleone so-
lution for rival plaintiffs' law firms would have the predictable
effect of driving that solution underground. The game would con-
sist of crafting agreements to afford the settlement designers
what one might describe as plausible deniability in the class set-
tlement review process under Rule 23(e), but nonetheless to fore-
stall the prospect of opt-outs actually obtaining representation by
firms knowledgeable about the litigation.
There is an additional enforcement vehicle, however, that,
appropriately enough, also bears a resemblance to events de-
picted in The Godfather.14 1 Michael Corleone's systematic elimina-
tion of rivals within the world of organized crime does not, in fact,
bring him closure. The death of one rival murdered in an espe-
cially grisly form on Michael's orders-casino owner Moe Greene,
famously shot through the eye in The Godfather 1 41--supplies the
13 See text accompanying note 64.
Proposed Rule 23(e)(2) would provide that "[tihe parties seeking approval of a
[class] settlement.., must file a statement identifying any agreement made in connection
with the proposed settlement." Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee at 102 (May
20, 2002), available online at <http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2002/CVRulesJC.pdf>
(visited Mar 22, 2003).
141 See John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They're Making a Federal Case Out
of It ... In State Court, 25 Harv J L & Pub Pol 143, 157-61 (2001) (Manhattan Institute
study showing disproportionate rates of class action filings in certain state courts); John
H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, Class Action Magnet Courts: The Allure Intensifies,
Civil Justice Rep No 5, Center for Legal Policy at the Manhattan Institute (July 2002)(subsequent study focusing on Madison County, Illinois) (available online at
<httpJ/www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cjrs5.htm> (visited Mar 6, 2003); Adam Liptak,
Court Has Dubious Record as Class Action Leader, NY Times A14 (Aug 15, 2002) (discuss-
ing abusive class settlements approved by state judges in Madison County).
"' Paramount 1972.
142 Id.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
impetus for plot developments in The Godfather Part 11.143 In that
sequel, Michael Corleone tangles with yet another rival in the
criminal underworld: Hyman Roth, who ultimately is revealed as
the mastermind behind a plot to murder Michael in order to gain
control of organized crime activities in pre-Castro Cuba and, as a
fringe benefit, to avenge the earlier murder of Roth's friend Moe
Greene on Michael's order. "
The larger point is one that should not be lost on the law of
class settlements: judicial review aside, an additional way to en-
force a stricture against the Michael Corleone solution is to turn
that technique against itself. The analogue in the class action
context would consist of a sequel: namely, a second class action
on behalf of the members of the original class whose benefits un-
der the settlement were reduced to fund the implementation of
the Michael Corleone solution. In the academic literature, Susan
Koniak and George Cohen have advanced a proposal along these
lines-albeit, without reference to agreements that seek to mini-
mize opt-outs by securing the docility of the law firms best posi-
tioned to represent opt-out claimants. "' Koniak and Cohen call
for lawsuits against class counsel under the federal antitrust
laws in the event that their deal-making binds class members to
an inadequate class settlement.
14 6
The full implications of the Koniak-Cohen proposal with re-
gard to class settlements as a whole are beyond the scope of this
Article. Koniak and Cohen understandably devote the bulk of
their discussion to whether doctrines of antitrust immunity
would shield class counsel from liability based upon the approval
of a class settlement by a governmental institution (the reviewing
court).' 47 I advance a more specific point here: the invocation of
antitrust strictures is especially apt with respect to the Michael
Corleone solution, for it amounts, at bottom, to a series of side
deals that do not comprise part of the class settlement agreement
on which a reviewing court passes judgment under Rule 23(e). As
such, there would be scant basis for application of antitrust im-
munity doctrines predicated upon some form of governmental
imprimatur.
13 Paramount 1974.
144 Id.
14 Koniak and Cohen, 82 Va L Rev at 1051 (cited in note 116).
Id at 1181.
... Id at 1183-1214.
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Questions of immunity aside, the law of antitrust has long
differentiated its treatment of vertical and horizontal non-
competition agreements.'48 Vertical agreements run between
firms at different rungs of the distribution chain-say, between
product manufacturers and retail sellers-whereas horizontal
agreements run between firms competing at the same rung."'
Antitrust law subjects vertical agreements not to compete to the
rule of reason, comparing their anticompetitive effects against
their justifications of efficiency; but antitrust law condemns per
se horizontal agreements not to compete.
150
Though the matter is not entirely free from doubt, a court
properly would characterize the implementation of the Michael
Corleone solution for opt-outs as a horizontal agreement not to
compete-specifically, an agreement on the part of rival plaintiffs'
law firms not to undercut the monopoly over the representation of
class members that class counsel otherwise would have. To be
sure, the rival plaintiffs' law firms might receive payment for
their agreement not to compete from the settling defendant
rather than from class counsel. That the payoffs pursuant to the
agreement might flow from a firm not part of the plaintiffs' bar,
however, would not prevent a court from characterizing the ar-
rangement as a horizontal agreement, at least as long as the as-
sent of each rival is effectively contingent upon all rivals agreeing
not to compete with class counsel."'
"' See United States v Topco Associate, Inc, 405 US 596, 608 (1972) (defining horizon-
tal and vertical restraints).
149 Id.
" Id at 607-08. Antitrust law does recognize some latitude for horizontal agreements
in industries in which such agreements "are essential if the product is to be available at
all." NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85, 101 (1984) (ap-
plying the rule of reason to restrictive agreements as part of an intercollegiate association
to facilitate athletic competition). The express recognition of the right to opt out in Rule 23
and the constitutional status of that right per Shutts would foreclose class settlement
designers from successfully arguing that the Michael Corleone solution for opt-outs is
somehow essential in order for Rule 23(b)(3) class settlements to exist at all.
. The Seventh Circuit characterized as a horizontal agreement an arrangement by
which toy retailer Toys 'R' Us entered into certain restrictive agreements with toy manu-
facturers concerning the distribution of their products. Toys 'V' Us, Inc v Federal Trade
Commission, 221 F3d 928, 934-36 (7th Cir 2000) (panel op by Wood). Although the pay-
ments underlying those agreements flowed vertically (from the retailer to the various
manufacturers), the court had no difficulty concluding that the arrangement nonetheless
must be condemned per se, given substantial evidence that the assent of each manufac-
turer to the distribution restrictions was contingent upon the assent of all rival manufac-
turers. Id at 936. Similarly, it would do no good for the class settlement designers to se-
cure agreements not to represent opt-out claimants only from some, but not all, realistic
rivals to class counsel within the plaintiffs' bar. For their part, those rivals would be
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As a matter of settled doctrine, moreover, antitrust law has
long condemned per se horizontal agreements not just between
actual competitors but also between an incumbent firm and po-
tential competitors. As the leading antitrust treatise observes:
[Tihe law does not condone the purchase of protection
from uncertain competition any more than it condones the
elimination of actual competition. Thus the general rule is
that naked horizontal market division agreements are
unlawful per se, whether or not the firms were actual
competitors in divided market segments before the agree-
ment was entered.
15 2
Whether with actual competitors or potential competitors, hori-
zontal agreements not to compete are condemned per se for much
the same reason that class action law should condemn the Mi-
chael Corleone solution to the problem of opt-outs: both effec-
tively transfer wealth from consumers (here, class members as
the consumers of class counsel's legal services) to would-be com-
petitors. In particular, antitrust law seeks to guard against pre-
cisely the sorts of agreements of the implicit, wink-and-nod vari-
ety likely to arise as ways to evade judicial review under Rule
23(e). Agreements to implement the Michael Corleone solution,
like agreements among rival firms not to compete in the world of
business, are unlikely to be spelled out on paper.
CONCLUSION
The unanticipated outgrowth of the Supreme Court's land-
mark class settlement decisions in Amchem and Ortiz has been to
invite efforts to craft ostensible opt-out settlements that deter the
exercise of the right to opt out.153 Courts nonetheless may draw a
principled line between permissible and impermissible deterrent
devices by reference to what one might call the "preexistence
principle": the proposition that the class action, unlike legislation,
unlikely to embrace restrictions on their ability to represent opt-out claimants without
assurance that all other rivals would be under the same restriction.
"2 Herbert Hovencamp, 12 Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and
Their Application 1 2030b at 175 (1999). See id 91 2030c at 177 (clarifying that "[a]lthough
the word 'division' may not always capture the nature of the agreement .... the important
element is that the agreements at issue are arrangements among competitors that give
one firm the right to restrict the way that a rival expands or innovates").
" See Part I B.
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enjoys no general mandate to alter preexisting rights. 54 Opt-out
class settlements cross the line from legitimate offers too good to
refuse into illegitimate coercion when they would alter the rights
even of those who choose to stand apart from the class.
The further step to which the foregoing approach points,
however, is for class settlement designers to leave the preexisting
rights of opt-out claimants undisturbed but to undertake meas-
ures to ensure that such claimants will be unable to find a lawyer
versed in the underlying litigation to take their case on an indi-
vidual basis. Such measures amount to agreements on the part of
rival firms within the plaintiffs' bar not to compete with class
counsel. The law should recognize these agreements as such by
subjecting class counsel and their defense counterparts to anti-
trust liability to recoup the resulting welfare loss to class mem-
bers.
One nevertheless should not conclude that the vanquishing of
what one might dub the Michael Corleone solution for opt-outs
somehow would mark the beginning of a golden era in the law of
class settlements. A more realistic view would hold that class set-
tlement designers will continue to develop increasingly sophisti-
cated measures to achieve closure while appropriating for them-
selves or their cohorts as much as they can of the gains from set-
tlement that class members themselves otherwise might enjoy.
The law of class actions must maintain a steady vigilance toward
those innovations. Michael Corleone, after all, lives to tell of his
dealings with Hyman Roth, not vice versa."'
"5 See Part II D
The Godfather Part II (Paramount 1974).

